Gombe State has, within days, become a key theatre in Nigeria’s emerging legal debate over political party primaries, membership registers and candidate eligibility ahead of the 2027 general elections.
First came the Federal High Court judgment nullifying the Peoples Democratic Party’s governorship primary that produced Professor Isa Ali Pantami and ordering a fresh exercise.
Then came the Supreme Court’s landmark pronouncement restoring key provisions of the Electoral Act 2026 dealing with party membership registers and candidate nomination.
And now, another Federal High Court sitting in Gombe has nullified the APC primary that produced Ali J.C. as candidate for the Balanga/Billiri Federal Constituency, ordered a fresh primary — and excluded Ali J.C. from participating in the rerun.
Taken together, these developments raise a larger question: what exactly has the law now established about who can participate in a party primary — and when does an alleged breach of that law translate into the loss of a candidate’s political ticket?
The Supreme Court has restored the statutory framework
On September 24, 2026, the Supreme Court allowed INEC’s appeal in the case arising from the Zenith Labour Party challenge and restored Sections 77(5), 77(6), 77(7) and 84(2) of the Electoral Act 2026.
The apex court held that the disputed provisions were not inconsistent with the 1999 Constitution, reversing the earlier Court of Appeal decision that had voided them.
The consequence is significant. Section 77 places statutory obligations around political parties’ membership registers and their use in primaries, congresses and conventions.
Section 77(5), as restored, deals with participation in party processes by reference to the relevant membership register; Section 77(6) concerns the register submitted to INEC; Section 77(7) provides consequences for a party that fails to meet the statutory requirement; and Section 84(2) governs the statutory methods for nominating candidates.
The Supreme Court’s decision therefore removes the constitutional uncertainty that had surrounded these provisions since the Court of Appeal judgment.
But there is an important distinction: restoring the law is not the same thing as deciding every individual candidate’s case.
The Supreme Court was determining the validity of the statutory provisions
challenged in the ZLP litigation. It did not conduct a blanket adjudication of the membership status or nomination process of every candidate produced by every political party. Indeed, legal analysis published after the judgment has noted that the certified full judgment was not yet publicly available at the time of that analysis, meaning that questions about the precise scope and application of the decision still require careful reading of the certified text.
That distinction matters enormously in Gombe.
Then came the PDP question
The first major test came with the PDP’s governorship contest.
The Federal High Court in Gombe, presided over by Justice Amina Aliyu Mohammed, nullified the process through which Isa Pantami emerged as the PDP’s governorship candidate and ordered the party to conduct a fresh primary. The court found that the process did not comply with the party’s laid-down procedures and applicable electoral provisions, including the exclusion of aspirants who had been screened and cleared to participate.
But the judgment is equally important for what the court did not do. The plaintiffs had sought reliefs relating to Pantami’s eligibility and party membership. The court did not grant the prayer seeking his outright removal as a PDP member. Instead, it ordered the party to return to the primary process.
The PDP subsequently cleared Pantami, Khamisu Mailantarki and Usman Aliyu Garry for the repeat primary. On September 29, the fresh exercise was conducted across the state’s eleven local government areas. Reports put Pantami at 817 votes, Mailantarki at 153 and Garry at 50.
That development brings the debate back to the central legal question: does the Supreme Court’s restoration of Section 77 automatically determine the eligibility of a candidate whose name may not have appeared on the relevant register?
The answer requires more than simply pointing to the Supreme Court judgment.
Section 88 becomes important
This is where Section 88 of the Electoral Act 2026 becomes particularly relevant.
The provision creates a judicial avenue for an aspirant who participated in a party primary and alleges that the Electoral Act or the party’s guidelines were not complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate. Most importantly, the statutory language contemplates a finding by a court before the consequential remedy is triggered.
That distinction is fundamental. It means there is a difference between:
1. a statutory requirement existing;
2. a party or candidate allegedly breaching that requirement; and
3. a court, after hearing the relevant parties and considering the evidence, determining that the breach occurred and making an order affecting the candidate.
The third stage is where an abstract statutory obligation becomes an individual judicial determination.
The Ali J.C. case moves the argument from theory to evidence
The Federal High Court in Gombe has now applied the restored Section 77 framework to a specific nomination dispute.
Justice Vera Ibrahim nullified the APC’s May 16 primary for the Balanga/Billiri Federal Constituency and ordered a fresh primary within 30 days. The court also excluded Ali J.C. from participating in the fresh exercise.
According to reports of the judgment, the court found that Ali’s name was not contained in the APC membership register submitted to INEC within the period prescribed by law. The reports further state that Ali joined the APC 16 days before the primary, while the statutory framework required the relevant membership register to have been submitted to INEC at least 21 days before the primary.
But notice the legal distinction. The court did not simply say: “The Supreme Court has restored Section 77, therefore Ali J.C. is disqualified.” Rather, it considered an individual challenge, examined the statutory requirement and made a finding concerning the particular candidate and the particular primary.
That is a fundamentally different judicial exercise.
Fair hearing remains central
This is where Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution enters the discussion.
The principle of fair hearing requires that a person whose legal rights or interests are to be adversely affected by a judicial order must have an opportunity to be heard. The restoration of Sections 77 and 84 therefore cannot reasonably be understood as an automatic judicial declaration that every candidate whose nomination is subsequently alleged to have violated those provisions has already been disqualified.
Each challenge still raises questions of fact and law:
• Was the candidate’s name on the relevant register?
• When was the register submitted to INEC?
• When did the candidate become a member of the party?
• What did the party actually submit to INEC?
• Was there evidence establishing compliance or non-compliance?
• Was the candidate a party to the proceedings?
• Was the alleged breach properly pleaded and proved?
• And, crucially, what remedy does the Electoral Act prescribe once the court makes its finding?
These are not questions that can be answered by citing the Supreme Court’s restoration of Section 77 alone.
Why Gombe is the interesting case study
The PDP episode and the Ali J.C. judgment may look similar on the surface because both involve disputed primaries. Legally, however, they illustrate different questions.
In the PDP case, the Federal High Court found problems with the process that produced Pantami and ordered a fresh primary, without granting the broader relief sought to remove him from the party. The party then conducted a repeat primary in which Pantami participated and emerged with 817 votes.
In the APC case, the court dealt directly with the eligibility of the aspirant to participate in the primary, based on the statutory membership-register requirement, and ordered that he be excluded from the fresh exercise.
The difference is subtle but important.
The Supreme Court restored the rule. The Federal High Court applied the rule to a particular dispute.
And that may be the most important legal lesson emerging from Gombe.
The bigger 2027 question
The implications extend beyond the PDP and APC in Gombe State.
Political parties may now have to pay much closer attention to the statutory status of their membership registers and the timing of their submissions to INEC. A candidate’s political popularity, previous electoral position or relationship with party structures does not by itself answer the statutory question. Neither does the mere possession of a party membership card necessarily resolve a dispute where the law attaches legal consequences to the register submitted to INEC within a specified period.
At the same time, the Supreme Court’s judgment should not be read as creating an automatic nationwide disqualification mechanism outside the judicial process. The law establishes the requirement. A litigant must challenge the alleged breach through the legally available process. The affected parties must have an opportunity to respond. The court must determine the facts and the applicable law. And only then can the consequential remedy contemplated by the Electoral Act follow.
From party politics to judicial compliance
The unfolding events in Gombe suggest that the 2027 nomination season may increasingly be fought not only at party congresses and primary venues, but also through documentary evidence:
• membership registers
• dates of submission to INEC
• dates of admission into political parties
• delegate lists
• screening records
• party guidelines
• certificates of return
• and the evidence presented before the courts
The politics may happen inside the party. But increasingly, the legality of the process may be determined by what the party can prove outside the political arena.
The PDP’s repeat primary has demonstrated that a court-ordered rerun can reopen a contest that appeared settled. The Ali J.C. judgment has gone a step further, showing that the restored statutory provisions can have direct consequences for an individual candidate when a court, in a specific case, finds non-compliance.
And that may be the real significance of the Supreme Court’s September 24 judgment. It did not decide every candidate’s fate. It restored the legal framework within which those individual disputes will now be decided.
The Supreme Court restored the law. The Federal High Court in Gombe has begun testing what that law means in individual cases.
For political parties preparing for 2027, the message is therefore less about who has already been disqualified and more about whether their nomination processes can survive scrutiny under the law — and, ultimately, before the courts.