Wednesday, November 18, 2026
  • Home
  • Politics
  • News
  • Business
  • Culture
  • National
  • Sports
  • Lifestyle
  • Travel
  • Opinion
PeriscopeNGA.com
  • APC rejects PDP allegation on PVC, personal data collection 
  • News
  • Politics
  • Business
  • Culture
  • Opinion
  • Lifestyle
  • Contact
No Result
View All Result
PeriscopeNGA.com
Home Columns

The blood-stained ballot: Sixty-six years of political arson, elite incendiarism, and the gathering inferno before January 2027, by Erasmus Ikhide

Chima by Chima
November 18, 2026
in Columns, Opinion, Opinion/Letter
0
John Mahama saved West African sovereignty while Nigeria swallowed the poison chalice, by Erasmus Ikhide 
1k
VIEWS
Share on FacebookShare on Twitter

 

​EXACTLY sixty days from today—Saturday, January 16, 2027—millions of Nigerians are scheduled to file into polling units across thirty-six states and the Federal Capital Territory to cast their ballots for the presidency and the National Assembly.

Related posts

Election 2027: Of democracy, ballots and bayonets, by Austen Akhagbeme

Election 2027: Of democracy, ballots and bayonets, by Austen Akhagbeme

November 18, 2026
1k
President Tinubu thanks mammoth crowd at PH campaign rally for loyalty, commends Wike, Fubara reconciliation

Between orchestration and discontent: Tinubu’s Plateau visit and the contested terrain of North-Central politics ahead of 2027, by Cliff Stanley

November 16, 2026
1k

Yet long before a single thumbprint touches a ballot paper, the campaign trail has already begun to smell of petrol, blood, and dread. In the second week of November 2026 alone, the alarms sounded from every institutional quarter across the federation.

Security analysts monitoring the early campaign season warned that more than seventy separate incidents of politically motivated attacks had already been logged nationwide, projecting that between sixty and seventy percent of prospective voters now harbor genuine fear about stepping out on election day.

In Delta State, a young man apprehended during a political clash was never handed over to the police; he was summarily killed in the street. In Lagos, armed party thugs descended on campaign gatherings and left supporters bloodied in broad daylight while bystanders fled for safety.

Even the National Assembly and civil society coalitions such as the Centre for Social Justice, Equity and Transparency (CESJET) were compelled to issue urgent condemnations, warning that desperate politicians were actively weaponizing street gangs to suppress turnout in opponents’ strongholds.

Meanwhile, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) dusted off statutory threats of ten-million-naira fines and prison terms for inflammatory campaigns—threats that seasoned observers treat with grim skepticism given decades of unbroken impunity.

​To treat this creeping terror as an isolated aberration of the 2027 cycle, however, would be an act of dangerous historical amnesia. Political violence in Nigeria is neither accidental nor spontaneous. It is a deliberate, intergenerational technology of power—a sordid, revolting architecture designed, funded, and normalized by a political class that views the state not as a commonwealth to be stewarded, but as an oil-soaked treasury to be captured by any means necessary.

From the colonial warrant chiefs of 1929 to the burning tyres of Operation Wetie in 1965, from the “do-or-die” edicts of the early Fourth Republic by former President Olusegun Obasanjo to former President Muhammadu Buhari’s “Monkeys and the Baboons socked in their own blood” to President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s “all is fair in politics” to the “Ba ma yi” (“We do not want you”) chants echoing across Northern rally grounds in November 2026, Nigeria’s electoral history reads like an unbroken indictment of elite recklessness.

​As the nation stands on the precipice of the January 16, 2027 polls—and the February 6 governorship contests that follow—a central, searing question confronts the republic: Can an administration whose economic shock therapy has battered millions of households pull the country back from the brink of full-blown electoral anarchy, or has the fuse already burned too close to the powder keg?

​*The Colonial Crucible: Roots of Coercive Politics Before October 1, 1960*

​Long before the Union Jack was lowered in Lagos on October 1, 1960, the foundational grammar of Nigerian political conflict was written in the ink of British colonial administration. Colonial governance was never designed to nurture democratic consensus or civic trust; it was an apparatus of extraction maintained through divide-and-rule tactics and administrative coercion.

British indirect rule did not merely govern through existing traditional institutions; where compliant structures did not exist, particularly in the segmented societies of southeastern Nigeria, colonial administrators arbitrarily invented them, creating unaccountable local autocrats known as warrant chiefs whose survival depended on coercive tax collection rather than popular consent.

​That combustible arrangement detonated in December 1929 during the historic Aba Women’s War. Sparked by the authoritarian excesses, corruption, and arbitrary taxation policies of British-appointed warrant chiefs across Owerri and Calabar provinces, tens of thousands of women mobilized in an unprecedented anti-colonial uprising. Armed only with palm fronds, songs of ridicule, and moral outrage, they besieged native courts and demanded the removal of the oppressive chiefs.

The colonial state answered popular grievance with lethal firepower: British troops opened fire on unarmed women in Utu Etim Ekpo, Abak, and Opobo, killing more than fifty protesters and wounding scores more. Even before formal party politics existed in Nigeria, the state had established a grim precedent—that political dissent was to be crushed with bullets rather than addressed through accountability.

​As urbanization, wartime economic scarcity, and nationalist agitation intensified in the 1940s, colonial authorities deliberately manipulated ethnic and regional fault lines to blunt unified anti-colonial resistance. In January 1945, simmering socio-economic frustrations and politically charged ethnic and labor tensions erupted into ferocious violence in Jos. Scores of citizens perished in street clashes that demonstrated how easily elite competition and economic deprivation could be weaponized along identity lines in Nigeria’s growing commercial centers.

​When constitutional reforms in the late 1940s and early 1950s finally introduced electoral competition, they grafted modern party politics onto a rigid regional tripod—North, West, and East—that turned every constitutional conference and every ballot box into an existential struggle for regional survival. Political parties such as the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), and the Action Group (AG) rapidly fused with regional bureaucracies, native authorities, marketing boards, and customary courts.

​The lethal consequences of this regionalized zero-sum game exploded on May 16, 1953, in Kano. Earlier that year, Chief Anthony Enahoro of the Action Group had moved a historic motion in the Federal House of Representatives demanding self-government for Nigeria by 1956. Northern delegates, fearing that immediate independence would leave the North dominated by the educationally and administratively more advanced South, countered with an amendment substituting “as soon as practicable.”

When Northern legislators stepped outside the parliament building in Lagos, they were jeered and insulted by hostile crowds. Weeks later, when an Action Group delegation led by Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola embarked on a political tour of Kano to campaign for the 1956 self-government agenda, simmering resentment boiled over. Four days of savage communal and political rioting tore through Sabon Gari, Kano, leaving dozens dead, hundreds wounded, and North-South mutual suspicion hardened on the very eve of decolonization.

​By the time the departing British administration organized the December 12, 1959 federal elections to manage the transition to independence, political thuggery had already been institutionalized as an indispensable campaign instrument. Across the three regions, dominant parties deployed native authority police, local tax assessors, customary court judges, and hired street enforcers to harass, detain, and intimidate opposition candidates and voters.

To support the opposition in one’s home region was to invite economic ruin, arbitrary arrest, or physical assault. Thus, when Nigeria hoisted its green-white-green flag on October 1, 1960, independence did not birth a culture of democratic tolerance; it merely handed sovereign firepower to a political elite already schooled in the arts of intimidation and winner-take-all exclusion.

*From Operation Wetie to June 12: Six Decades of Post-Independence Bloodletting*

​Independence did not exorcise the demon of electoral violence; it stripped away the colonial referee and left rival regional titans locked inside a single constitutional arena with vast state resources at stake. Between 1960 and the return to civil rule in 1999, every attempt at democratic governance foundered on the rocks of rigged censuses, stolen ballots, and state-sponsored street terror.

​Within two years of independence, the fragile coalition governing the First Republic began to fracture. Because parliamentary representation—and consequently control over federal revenue and patronage—was tied directly to regional population figures, the 1962–1963 national census ceased to be a statistical exercise and became a demographic war. Regional governments inflated figures wildly, rejected each other’s counts, and poisoned national cohesion.

Simultaneously, a bitter ideological and personality split inside the Action Group between party leader Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Western Region Premier Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola tore Yorubaland apart. Exploiting the rift, the federal government declared a state of emergency in the West, jailed Awolowo and his key lieutenants on treasonable felony charges, and installed Akintola’s unpopular faction in power through federal backing.
​
By the time the December 1964 federal elections and the October 1965 Western Regional elections arrived, constitutional norms had collapsed entirely. In the 1964 federal polls, opposition candidates across the North and West were systematically prevented from filing nomination papers; electoral officers vanished from their offices until filing deadlines expired, allowing ruling-party candidates to be declared “unopposed.”

When the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) called a partial boycott, the nation teetered on the edge of constitutional breakdown before a shaky compromise salvaged the central government.
​The true reckoning arrived ten months later during the October 11, 1965 Western Regional election. Determined to retain power despite overwhelming popular hostility, Akintola’s Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), backed by federal security apparatus, oversaw one of the most brazen electoral heists in African history.

Ballot boxes were stuffed in broad daylight; returning officers altered figures at gunpoint; and results were announced over state radio in direct contradiction to tallies recorded at polling stations.

​The popular backlash across Western Nigeria was swift, ferocious, and apocalyptic. Outraged citizens launched Operation Wetie—a Yoruba phrase meaning “wet him with petrol”—a horrifying campaign of street justice, arson, and political assassination in which mobs doused political opponents, electoral collaborators, and their houses in petrol and set them ablaze.

For three months, major towns across the West—Ibadan, Ilesa, Abeokuta, Mushin, and Ogbomoso—burned uncontrollably as hundreds of people perished in the flames. The civilian government proved utterly incapable of restoring order, creating the exact vacuum that young army majors exploited on January 15, 1966, when they overthrew the First Republic in a bloody military coup. That intervention triggered a chain reaction of counter-coups, anti-Igbo pogroms in the North, and the catastrophic thirty-month Nigerian Civil War that claimed more than a million lives.

​When General Olusegun Obasanjo handed power to President Shehu Shagari in October 1979 after thirteen years of military rule, Nigerians prayed that the trauma of fratricidal war had finally chastened the political class. The Second Republic’s first transition election in 1979 passed with relatively contained friction under military supervision, though disputed in court over the mathematical definition of “two-thirds of nineteen states.”

Four years later, however, with civilians firmly in charge of the electoral machinery, the ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN) proved that the political elite had learned nothing and forgotten nothing. In the August 1983 general elections, the NPN sought to manufacture a “landslide” victory across traditional opposition strongholds in the West and East.

State agencies, electoral commissioners, and paramilitary police units were deployed to overturn clear voter preferences, most notoriously in Ondo and Oyo states, where candidates who had visibly lost at the polling units were declared winners by the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO).

Outraged citizens erupted in violent rebellion across Ondo and Oyo, burning government buildings, party offices, and the homes of politicians accused of mandate theft, leaving scores dead in street battles with riot police. Barely four months later, on December 31, 1983, Major General Muhammadu Buhari overthrew Shagari’s civilian administration, citing widespread corruption, economic mismanagement, and the violent electoral farce of 1983 as his primary justification.

​A decade later, Nigerians demonstrated that ordinary citizens were never the root cause of electoral violence when given a transparent process. On June 12, 1993, under General Ibrahim Babangida’s long-delayed transition program, voters across every ethnic, regional, and religious divide went to the polls in calm, orderly dignity and elected Chief Moshood Kashimawo Olawale (MKO) Abiola of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in what remains universally acclaimed as the freest, fairest, and most peaceful election in Nigerian history.

Yet when Babangida arbitrarily annulled the election on June 23, 1993, the military state itself became the chief perpetrator of political terror. Pro-democracy demonstrators pouring onto the streets of Lagos, Ibadan, and Abeokuta were met with live military gunfire; human rights monitors documented more than one hundred unarmed citizens shot dead by security forces in July 1993 alone.

Under General Sani Abacha, who seized power in November 1993, state-sponsored political violence mutated into targeted assassinations—claiming figures like Kudirat Abiola and Alfred Rewane—alongside arbitrary detentions, bombings, and the judicial murder of writer and environmentalist Ken Saro-Wiwa, turning Nigeria into an international pariah until Abacha’s sudden death in June 1998 forced a hasty transition to the Fourth Republic.

​*The Fourth Republic’s Incendiary Lexicon: “Do-or-Die,” “Baboons,” and “All Is Fair*”

​When Nigeria inaugurated its Fourth Republic on May 29, 1999, there was widespread optimism that twenty-eight years of cumulative military dictatorship had forged an elite consensus around democratic preservation. Instead, the two dominant political formations of the modern era—first the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and subsequently the All Progressives Congress (APC)—systematically perfected a culture of political gangsterism.

Worse still, the highest-ranking leaders of both parties poisoned the public square with an incendiary, warlike lexicon that gave street thugs moral and political permission to maim and kill.
​Across the seven general election cycles held between 1999 and 2023, thousands of Nigerians have been slaughtered on the altar of party ambition. In 1999, localized violence and Niger Delta militia mobilization claimed roughly eighty lives.

By 2003, as PDP governors and federal incumbents sought to consolidate power, state-backed thugs and paramilitary gangs killed over one hundred people while snatching ballot boxes across the South-South, South-East, and North-Central zones.
​The moral rot reached an unprecedented nadir ahead of the April 2007 general elections.

Speaking at a PDP stakeholders’ meeting in Abeokuta, Ogun State, outgoing President Olusegun Obasanjo—the very man who had once criticized the electoral frauds of 1983—declared that the upcoming election was a “do-or-die affair” for him and the ruling party. Those four reckless words immediately became the unofficial constitution of Nigerian electoral politics.

Foot soldiers, party chairmen, state governors, and security commanders interpreted the Commander-in-Chief’s pronouncement as an executive directive to rig, intimidate, and eliminate obstacles at any cost. Pre-election assassinations claimed gubernatorial aspirants in Lagos and Ekiti; polling stations were overrun by armed gangs; and results were written in hotel rooms before voting even concluded.

Over three hundred Nigerians were killed in election-related violence in 2007—a process so brazenly compromised that the eventual beneficiary, President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, took the extraordinary step at his inauguration of admitting that the election that brought him to power was deeply flawed.

​Yet the opposition proved no less culpable in weaponizing apocalyptic rhetoric. In April 2011, following the presidential contest between incumbent Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP and former military ruler Muhammadu Buhari of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), Northern Nigeria erupted into the deadliest post-election carnage since the Civil War.

Fuelled by allegations of rigging and ethno-religious polarization, mobs swept across twelve Northern states over three days, burning churches, mosques, homes, and electoral offices, and slaughtering more than eight hundred citizens—including ten young National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) members in Bauchi State who had been deployed as ad-hoc electoral officials to serve their fatherland.

​Rather than dedicating his voice unconditionally to de-escalation after that national tragedy, Muhammadu Buhari—addressing supporters in Kaduna in May 2012 while warning against electoral malpractice in the forthcoming 2015 polls—uttered a prophecy that sent chills down the spine of the republic: “If what happened in 2011 should again happen in 2015, by the grace of God, the dog and the baboon would all be soaked in blood.”

Although his spokespersons scrambled to explain that the statement was a traditional Hausa proverb warning that injustice destroys both oppressor and victim alike, in a country still mourning hundreds of murdered youth corps members and displaced families, the imagery of blood-soaked streets poured raw kerosene onto dry tinder.

​When Bola Ahmed Tinubu later emerged as the presidential standard-bearer of the All Progressives Congress (APC), he brought to the national arena a ruthless, hyper-transactional philosophy of power forged over more than two decades of political hegemony in Lagos.

In January 2023, addressing party faithful in Abeokuta, Tinubu famously declared that political power is never served a la carte in a restaurant, instructing his supporters to “grab it, snatch it, and run with it”—a maxim echoed across party circles by the equally cynical creed that “all is fair in politics.”
​
For party enforcers patrolling the streets of Lagos, Rivers, Kogi, and Kano during the 2023 general elections, the message transmitted from the apex of leadership required no translation: rules, democratic ethics, and the bodily safety of dissenting voters were entirely subordinate to victory.

In Lagos during the February and March 2023 polls, armed thugs openly mounted roadblocks, profiled voters by ethnicity, smashed heads with wooden planks and machetes, and chased citizens away from polling units in broad daylight while uniformed police officers stood idly by. In Rivers and Kogi states, cult gangs aligned with rival political camps turned local government collation centers into war zones.

​Across both the PDP and the APC, the foundational bargain of Fourth Republic politics has remained identically sordid: recruit desperate, unemployed youths; arm them with cash, illicit drugs, and pump-action rifles during election season; deploy them to terrorize opponents and stuff ballot boxes; and once power is captured, reward their godfathers with lucrative public contracts while leaving the foot soldiers armed and idle until the next cycle of bloodletting.

​*The Architecture of Impunity: How the Political Class Manufactures Thugs*

​Why does political violence recur in Nigeria with the grim predictability of the rainy season every four years? Because for the architects of party violence, the financial and political return on investment is astronomical while the legal consequence is virtually zero.

​At the root of this pathology lies the political economy of state capture. In Nigeria’s rentier economy, political office is not merely a platform for public service; it is the primary gateway to stupendous personal wealth, control over oil rents and public procurement, and constitutional immunity from prosecution.

Losing an election does not mean retiring gracefully to a shadow cabinet or a lucrative private-sector career; for many members of the political class, losing power means financial bankruptcy, abandonment by fair-weather allies, and immediate exposure to anti-corruption investigations by whoever captures the state apparatus.

Consequently, incumbents and challengers alike approach every electoral cycle as an existential battle for survival where every moral boundary is expendable.

​Second is the deliberate weaponization of mass poverty. Decades of elite looting, infrastructure decay, and deindustrialization have produced a vast reserve army of tens of millions of unemployed and underemployed young men with bleak economic prospects. Far from viewing youth joblessness as a national security crisis to be solved, predatory politicians treat poverty as a strategic asset.

By keeping millions of citizens economically dependent, political godfathers can step forward every four years as benevolent patrons, distributing crisp naira notes, commercial motorcycles, bags of rice, and illicit narcotics in exchange for street muscle. The very same state governors who insist their treasuries cannot afford a living minimum wage for teachers, doctors, or civil servants effortlessly mobilize billions of naira in untraceable security votes to fund “youth mobilization squads” and “task forces” during election campaigns.

​Third is institutional capture and selective policing. On paper, Nigeria’s Electoral Act prescribes severe penalties—including heavy fines and multi-year prison sentences—for electoral offences such as thuggery, ballot snatching, hate speech, intimidation, and vote buying. In reality, across seven general elections since 1999, hardly a single high-ranking political sponsor of electoral violence has ever been convicted and sent to prison.

Street thugs arrested on Saturday afternoon with stolen ballot boxes or machetes are routinely released on Sunday morning following phone calls from government houses or party secretariats. When perpetrators know that the commissioner of police, the state attorney general, and the ruling-party chairman all answer to the same political godfather, violence ceases to carry any deterrent risk and becomes standard operating procedure.

​*Economic Shock Therapy and the “Ba Ma Yi” Revolt: The 2027 Tinderbox*

​What makes the countdown to January 16, 2027 uniquely dangerous—and potentially far more explosive than 2007, 2011, or 2023—is that the traditional machinery of party thuggery is colliding head-on with an unprecedented wave of raw, visceral citizen anger born of acute economic trauma.

​From the very first day of his presidency on May 29, 2023—when he stepped up to the podium at Eagle Square in Abuja and abruptly declared, “Fuel subsidy is gone,” without a single palliative framework, public mass-transit alternative, or social safety net in place—President Bola Ahmed Tinubu subjected more than two hundred million Nigerians to the most punishing economic shock therapy in peacetime history.

Paired shortly thereafter with the sudden floating of the naira, that boneheaded, ill-sequenced gamble unleashed a hyper-inflationary whirlwind that obliterated middle-class savings, shuttered thousands of factories and small businesses, drove food inflation to suffocating heights, and plunged tens of millions of citizens deeper into multidimensional poverty.

​As chronicled extensively across my twelve-part investigative series, “Fuel Subsidy Removals and Years of Economic Turmoil,” the human toll of that policy has been nothing short of catastrophic.

Premium Motor Spirit (petrol), which sold at ₦187 per litre prior to May 2023, rocketed past ₦600, breached ₦1,000, and surged to ₦1,450 per litre in markets across the federation. Because Nigeria’s economy runs almost entirely on petrol and diesel generators and road haulage, that eight-fold explosion in fuel prices cascaded mercilessly into the cost of every tuber of yam, every bag of rice, every school bus fare, and every hospital prescription.

​Instead of meeting this mass suffering with genuine humility and structural relief, the administration has repeatedly offered optics that citizens perceive as tone-deaf mockery. When the government recently trumpeted a marginal petrol price reduction of roughly ₦60 per litre—coming after Nigerians had already been forced to endure an astronomical surge from ₦187 to ₦1,450 per litre, only for independent fuel marketers to adjust pump prices upward again the very next day—the reaction across motor parks, markets, and households was not gratitude, but furious derision.

To an electorate bled white by over three years of relentless inflation, shaving ₦60 off a ₦1,450 litre of petrol and expecting applause felt beyond insult; it was akin to tossing a cup of water onto a burning house while boasting of fire-fighting prowess.
​That accumulated economic grief is now spilling directly onto the 2027 campaign trail, transforming northern and southern rally grounds into arenas of open popular revolt.

Across Northern Nigeria—a region whose massive voter turnout was the indispensable bedrock of the APC’s presidential victories in 2015, 2019, and 2023—the political mood has shifted dramatically from patient endurance to defiant rejection. At public appearances and campaign corridors in November 2026, crowds have greeted the President’s second-term push not with the rehearsed choreography of praise singers, but with thunderous, spontaneous chants of “Ba ma yi!”—Hausa for “We do not want you!”—accompanied by viral scenes of jeering citizens and stones hurled at official campaign convoys.

​Even prominent insiders and former architects of the ruling party have publicly warned that attempting to force through a second-term ambition against the grain of such widespread grassroots alienation risks plunging the nation into an existential crisis. Yet, rather than recalibrating with empathy, the administration has doubled down—insisting on campaign podiums that fuel subsidy will never return, dismissing critics as “liars,” and projecting an aura of electoral inevitability anchored on the formidable incumbency muscle of the APC across thirty-one states.

​Here lies the lethal flashpoint for January 2027: an unpopular incumbency determined to retain power at all costs meeting an impoverished, angry electorate determined to reject it at the ballot box. Political history teaches a sobering lesson about this exact collision. Whenever a ruling apparatus senses that its organic popularity has evaporated, the temptation to substitute coercion, voter suppression, and street violence for democratic persuasion grows exponentially.

Conversely, when desperate, hungry citizens believe that state agents and hired thugs are being mobilized to steal their only remaining peaceful weapon—their vote—the likelihood of violent street retaliation skyrockets.

​*Sixty Days to January 16, 2027: Can the Presidency Halt the Descent into Anarchy*?

​With the presidential and National Assembly elections fixed for Saturday, January 16, 2027—just two months away—and governorship and state assembly elections scheduled for February 6, 2027, the hourglass is emptying with terrifying speed.

The more than seventy violent incidents already recorded across the country in the opening weeks of campaigning are merely the tremors before a potential earthquake. Can President Bola Ahmed Tinubu reinvent his presidency, reverse the trajectory of public alienation, and put a decisive stop to the slide toward full-blown electoral anarchy before January 16?

​In strict political terms, reinventing an entire economic legacy in sixty days is impossible. No amount of last-minute campaign rhetoric, media spin, or cosmetic ₦60 fuel discounts can erase three and a half years of currency collapse, destroyed purchasing power, and empty dinner tables. For millions of Nigerian families, the verdict on the administration’s economic stewardship is already written in daily hardship.

​However, preventing Nigeria from descending into full-blown electoral anarchy is still entirely within the President’s constitutional power—if, and only if, he possesses the statesmanship to place the survival of the republic above the desperation of party enforcers. Pulling the nation back from the precipice over the next sixty days requires immediate, concrete, uncompromising action rather than familiar platitudes.

​First, the President must publicly disown and order the immediate arrest of state-sponsored thugs across all party lines, starting with his own ruling APC. Words issued from the Presidential Villa are no longer sufficient.

As Commander-in-Chief, President Tinubu must issue an unambiguous, public directive to the Inspector-General of Police, the Director-General of the Department of State Services (DSS), and the National Security Adviser to arrest, disarm, and prosecute every political thug and every political sponsor caught disrupting opposition rallies, attacking rival supporters, or stockpiling arms.

Nothing deters electoral violence faster than seeing a sitting commissioner, a state party chairman, or a prominent political financier arraigned in court without bail.

​Second, the presidency must guarantee strict operational neutrality from security agencies and INEC. The surest way to ignite a repeat of 1965, 1983, or 2011 is for citizens to perceive the Nigeria Police Force, the armed forces, and the electoral commission as partisan branches of the ruling party.

Security deployments on January 16 must protect voters in opposition strongholds just as rigorously as those in ruling-party bastions, and INEC must guarantee transparent, real-time electronic transmission and collation of results in strict compliance with the Electoral Act 2026.

​Third, special electoral offences prosecution teams must be activated immediately. INEC’s recurring threats of ten-million-naira fines and jail terms ring hollow because regular courts are choked with endless adjournments. Partnering immediately with the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) and the judiciary to fast-track the trial of pre-election violence suspects before January 16 would send an unmistakable shockwave through the underworld of political thuggery.

​Fourth, the presidency must silence the merchants of ethnic profiling and incendiary rhetoric within its own ranks. A leader who claims the mantle of a lifelong democrat cannot preside over a campaign in which governors, ministers, and spokespersons threaten opposition voters with exile, ethnic exclusion, or physical harm in Lagos, Rivers, Kano, or any other battleground state.

​Finally, the administration must implement emergency, tangible cost-of-living relief free of partisan gimmicks. While structural economic recovery takes years, immediate executive action to crash interstate food haulage costs, suspend punitive import duties on essential pharmaceuticals and agricultural inputs, and expand transparent, non-partisan relief can lower the boiling temperature of public despair before voters step up to the ballot boxes.

​*A Reminder to President Bola Tinubu, the Democrat*

​Every Nigerian leader eventually arrives at a defining crossroads where personal ambition collides head-on with national preservation. In 1965, the political elite chose arrogance and stolen ballots—and plunged the young republic into military rule and civil war.

In 1983, the ruling party chose a manufactured landslide—and invited nearly sixteen years of military dictatorship. In 2007 and 2011, incendiary rhetoric and unchecked thuggery turned polling stations into slaughterhouses. President Bola Ahmed Tinubu has spent three decades reminding Nigerians that he stood on the barricades of the June 12 struggle to rescue democracy from authoritarian ruin.

On January 16, 2027, history will strip away every campaign billboard, every paid endorsement, and every contrived economic talking point to judge him on one irreducible standard: whether he allowed Nigerians to freely choose their leaders in peace, or presided over a blood-stained ballot in a desperate bid to cling to power.

​Sixty days remain on the clock. The matches are already lit, the dry grass stretches across all thirty-six states, and the harmattan wind is rising. Whether January 2027 becomes a milestone of democratic accountability or another tragic chapter in Nigeria’s long anthology of political arson rests squarely in the hands of those who hold the instruments of state today.

Erasmus Ikhide contributed this piece via: ikhideluckyerasmus@gmail.com

Tags: and the gathering inferno before January 2027by Erasmus Ikhideelite incendiarismSixty-six years of political arsonThe blood-stained ballot
Previous Post

Gombe 2027: APC gov’ship candidate unveils manifesto, promises 100,000 jobs, 1,000km roads

Next Post

FTH Gombe CMD appointed global peace ambassador

Next Post
FTH Gombe CMD appointed global peace ambassador

FTH Gombe CMD appointed global peace ambassador

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

BROWSE BY CATEGORIES

  • Advertorial
  • Agriculture
  • Appointment
  • Business
  • Columns
  • Covid-19
  • Crime
  • Culture
  • Development
  • Education
  • Family Planning
  • Features
  • Finding Purpose with Oluwatimileyin
  • Health
  • Interview
  • Investigation
  • Keeping It Real With Nneka
  • Lifestyle
  • Malnutrition
  • National
  • News
  • News
  • NYSC
  • Opinion
  • Opinion/Letter
  • Pillow Talks With Keziah
  • Politics
  • Responsible Parenting with Oluwatobi Akintola
  • Sport
  • Sports
  • Technology
  • Travel
  • Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

BROWSE BY TOPICS

#Gombe 000 2022 2023 2027 Abia Abuja Adamawa Again Apc Bauchi by Austen Akhagbeme by Ben Ngwakwe by Citizen Bolaji O. Akinyemi by Cliff Stanley by Destiny O. Enabulele By Douglas Ogbankwa by Erasmus Ikhide by Hassan Gimba by Tony Erha Campaign CBN Commissioner Edo 2024 ekiti state FG Gombe Gombe Gov Gombe State Gov Yahaya Inec insecurity Mailantarki nigeria NNPP North-East NYSC others Pdp Police Qatar Taraba Tinubu USAID women
  • About
  • Advertise
  • Careers
  • Contact

© 2023 PeriscopeNGA.com - Periscope Nigeria | Website by Sociopact.

No Result
View All Result
  • Home
  • Politics
  • News
  • Business
  • Culture
  • National
  • Sports
  • Lifestyle
  • Travel
  • Opinion

© 2023 PeriscopeNGA.com - Periscope Nigeria | Website by Sociopact.