Nigeria’s voters’ register is not a bureaucratic spreadsheet; it is the legal foundation on which every ballot, result and claim of victory must rest. The discovery of suspected AI-generated photographs, duplicate records and other irregularities in the preliminary register for the 2027 general election is, therefore, not a technical embarrassment. It is a constitutional alarm.
INEC’s Director of Information and Communication Technology, Dr Lawrence Bayode, has said that some registration officers used authorised login credentials to introduce questionable entries, including AI-generated images, into the registration system. He said the commission’s Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS) flagged the anomalies, while other defects resulted from poor registration practices.
That admission is important, but it is not yet accountability.
The preliminary register was published online on October 26, 2026, following its physical display at registration areas from October 9 to 15. It contained more than 103.4 million registered voters. Public scrutiny soon identified suspicious images, apparent duplicates and other anomalies.
Bayode’s explanation, reported by multiple media outlets, was that INEC had not deployed AI for voter registration, but that some photographs in the preliminary register appeared to be AI-generated. He attributed the introduction of irregular records to registration officers who allegedly abused their access to the system.
INEC says ABIS identified 268 records for review and that verification, adjudication and data cleaning will be completed before the final register is certified on December 15, 2026.
The commission has also received 5,400 claims and objections arising from the public display.
These facts justify concern, but they do not, by themselves, prove a coordinated plot by INEC, the All Progressives Congress (APC) and “organised crime” to rig the 2027 election. Allegations of such gravity require evidence: named officers, system logs, forensic findings, identified beneficiaries, prosecutions and court-tested conclusions. What the episode does prove is that the integrity of the register can be compromised from within and that public confidence cannot be restored through assurances alone.
A voters’ register performs three democratic functions. It defines who is eligible to vote; limits opportunities for impersonation, multiple voting and fabricated participation; and provides the evidentiary basis for auditing election results.
If fictitious voters can be added to the register, the danger is not merely that fake people may vote. It is that genuine votes can be diluted, results can be inflated in targeted locations, and losing parties can be given credible grounds to challenge the outcome. Electoral legitimacy depends not only on accurately counting votes but also on establishing that only qualified, living, registered persons were allowed to cast them.
The alleged misuse of official login credentials is particularly serious. It suggests that the vulnerability may not have been limited to external hacking or ordinary clerical errors, but could involve insider abuse of administrative authority.
INEC should treat this as a forensic and institutional emergency, not a public relations problem. Its response must be visible, verifiable and independent.
1. Publish the scale and pattern of contamination
INEC should disclose, in aggregate and without exposing personal biometric data:
- The total number of flagged, suspended, corrected and deleted entries.
- The distribution of irregular records by state, local government area, registration area and registration centre.
- The categories of defects, including suspected AI-generated images, duplicate biometric records, records relating to deceased or implausible registrants, incomplete data and entries created through suspicious access patterns.
- The dates and times of suspicious entries, where disclosure would not compromise ongoing investigations.
Secrecy about the scale of the problem would reinforce the public’s worst fears. Transparency about the methodology, while protecting voters’ privacy, is the only democratic response.
2. Preserve and audit the evidence
INEC must immediately preserve immutable copies of the registration database, ABIS reports, officers’ login records, device records, IP addresses, audit trails, upload histories and all records connected to the flagged entries.
It should commission an independent forensic audit by credible external experts, with observers drawn from registered political parties, civil society organisations, the media, the National Assembly and, where appropriate, security agencies. The audit should examine not only the 268 records publicly reported but also whether the same methods resulted in wider contamination.
3. Identify and discipline culpable officers
Where evidence establishes that an officer knowingly inserted false records, misused credentials, facilitated impersonation, accepted inducements or obstructed an investigation, INEC should suspend the officer pending due process, revoke their system access and refer the matter to law enforcement and anti-corruption agencies.
Sanctions should be proportionate to the level of culpability but sufficiently severe to deter future misconduct. These should include:
- Administrative interdiction and removal from electoral duties for negligent registration failures.
- Dismissal and permanent disqualification from electoral employment for deliberate falsification.
- Criminal prosecution for forgery, falsification of records, unlawful access to computer systems, conspiracy, corruption or electoral offences.
- Recovery of any benefits obtained and publication of final disciplinary outcomes, subject to fair hearing requirements.
Punishment must not stop at junior field officers. If supervisors, contractors, political actors or security personnel enabled or benefited from the misconduct, they must also face the law. Accountability that reaches only the powerless is not accountability; it is scapegoating.
4. Correct the register before certification
Before December 15, INEC should complete a transparent clean-up exercise that includes:
- Removing or quarantining every record that cannot be verified through lawful registration evidence.
- De-duplicating records through biometric and demographic checks, with a fair appeals process for citizens wrongly flagged.
- Re-verifying questionable photographs against original capture records, where available.
- Notifying affected voters and providing a practical mechanism for submitting claims, objections and appeals.
- Publishing a pre- and post-cleaning reconciliation report showing how many entries were added, removed, corrected and retained.
The final register should not merely be declared clean. It should be demonstrably clean.
5. Harden the system against recurrence
INEC should introduce mandatory multi-factor authentication for registration officers, role-based access controls, real-time anomaly detection, geolocation and device verification, tamper-evident audit logs, periodic external penetration testing and independent reviews of high-risk registration centres.
No officer should be able to create or alter voter records without leaving a traceable digital footprint. No bulk changes should be made without supervisory approval and automated alerts. No electoral database should depend solely on the honesty of insiders.
The political parties’ duty
The APC, as the governing party, has a particular obligation to demand a full investigation. Silence may be politically convenient, but it is strategically self-defeating: a tainted register would damage the legitimacy of any future APC victory as much as it would undermine confidence in the electoral process.
Opposition parties, meanwhile, should pursue evidence through lawful channels, including formal petitions, requests to participate in the audit, litigation where necessary and public documentation of specific irregularities. They should resist the temptation to turn suspicion into a verdict. The country needs credible challenges, not indiscriminate accusations.
Civil society organisations, the media and citizens should continue scrutinising the register but must handle personal data responsibly. The goal is to expose systemic failures, not to publish private biometric information or harass innocent voters.
INEC’s promise to clean the register before December 15 is necessary but insufficient.
The commission must meet a higher standard: publish its findings; explain how the irregularities occurred; identify those responsible through due process; remove every unverifiable record; invite independent verification; prosecute proven offenders; and reform the system to prevent a recurrence of the same abuse.
If INEC does these things, the episode could become evidence that Nigeria’s electoral institutions can detect, correct and punish internal abuse. If it does not, the preliminary register will remain a political wound heading into 2027.
Nigeria does not need a perfect register to hold a credible election. But it needs a register whose defects are known, corrected, independently verified and credibly explained.
Anything less leaves the 2027 election vulnerable to a question no winner should want to answer: How many of the votes that produced this victory belonged to people who never existed?
Cliff Stanley is a political scientist and public theologian. He writes from Jos, Plateau State, and the ECWA Theological Seminary (JETS).